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The 777's first fatal accident in over 18 years of service :(

It was human error not the airplane that is good

Weston wrote on Jul 7^th, 2013 at 4:34am:

It was human error not the airplane that is good

I don't want to sound rude, but lets not jump to conclusions yet. I do lean the same way though. In my honest opinion, there were two issues with that approach, one of them that they either stalled or were just too low, and that they were really right, at least looking at the debris field.

I thought I'd cover some of the things I've heard and my thoughts on them. First off, some news organizations already obtained ATC tapes which are readily available on Youtube, and along with some "experts" have been starting to piece together the series of events. The problem is that clip of ATC on Youtube I've seen CNN use missed a HUGE part of the actual transmissions, where someone assumingly in the background of the tower controlled notices the crash. There are a lot of misleading ideas because of that. What did actually happen according to ATC recordings, the plane crashed, and THEN emergency crews were summoned.

The idea of tired pilots raises another possibility, but that is not the first time that flight has happened, it is quite frequent, along with a flight to LAX under the same flight number, at least according to Flightaware. The idea that the pilots were too tired seems far feteched, especially if I am not mistaken, usually the longest a flight crew can fly in a day is 8 hours (although that is US guidelines if I am not mistaken, and this is not a US airline) which means chances are there was a second flight crew to relieve the first crew. The flight is about 10-11 hours from what I recall looking at.

Now the third and final thing I want to say is that do not rule out mechanical issues. Maintenance among other things could have also played a role. Although it seems there was an issue with pitch and glide slope, there is a chance that something might have lead to that. And they say it was a manual landing, but I do not know where that came from (correct me if I am wrong and missing something). They could have been using ILS for all we know. I think they said that it was a visual approach, but it could have been ILS assisted, and that brought it down.

So it could have been pilot error, just a little too slow and too much pitch, and especially at an airport like San Fran, it can really hurt you. Yet I would wait till we hear about flight data recording stuff, and that won't be long (probably not long till the countless documentaries are made too). It probably is not a repeat of the icing engine performance issue, but it could have been a bird strike that went undetected at the last minute. The only people who know and who will know are the investigators, and the pilot.

Sorry it is a little long, but thought I'd give my thoughts.

-Tom H

ILS was inop and there was a NOTAM released. There is also some speculation that the VASI lights were inop as well. Weather clear with 10+ vis/

I also heard that this was a VFR approach. An experienced accident investigator on CNN has opined that this was pilot error , i.e. , the aircraft was below the glide slope, and did not apply power at a sufficient altitude to successfully initiate a go around. Although this opinion is somewhat speculative. and we will have to await black box data for the exact details. It would appear that observer information may confirm this. It is sad that two lives were lost but it could have been much worse.
Ron

7 seconds before impact: Speed acknowledged by pilots
4 seconds before impact: Throttle increased to attempt to increase speed
1.5 seconds before impact: Go-Around initiated by pilot

Landing speed was calculated to be 137 knots, actual speed was "significantly less than 137 knots."

Pilot in command was new to the 777 and still in transition phase with approx. 43 hours in the aircraft type.

We armchair pilots do not have the right to speculate NOR should we. I've seen most all the footage and all I can say is the B777 is the MOST sturdy aircraft I've seen to date. To come to rest after that with so few casualties is nothing less than amazing. I also refer to Heathrow!. AND as with that incident we still cannot eliminate fuel (iceing) contamination or what ever.

I wonder what Lou's opinion is at this early stage , also can the engines spool up if there is fuel starvation, i.e. icing of the fuel?
Ron

I have to agree with Bruce of Lost in Isaan:

The 777 is truly a sturdy built aircraft. The amount of structure that remained at zero motion was remarkable.

The following is speculation

Here is a printout from a site that records flights from radar information.
http://flightaware.com/live/flight/AAR214/history/20130706/0730Z/RKSI/KSFO/tracklog

http://img191.imageshack.us/img191/9228/ycdc.png

Interesting data here. �Less than 2 min to landing, he was at 169 kts/194 mph passing 1400', vertical speed 1380 fpm down. �Descent rate remains at 1300 fpm or more until 600' above the ground with decreasing airspeed. �Airspeed continues to decay to below normal as descent rate decreases to a more normal value. �Looks like the nose is coming up but without power increase. �Then at 100' above the ground (water) airspeed is down to 109kts, looks like a big pitch up at low airspeed. �Likely they were in a stall condition prior to touchdown. �Fits a classic high unstabilized visual descent with an pitch overcorrection near the ground with little to no power increase leading to a stall. �Just my opinion from the raw data.

I flew a few approaches in the CS 777 to see what it would look like from the cockpit and the ground. I set a landing weight around 400,000# which gave me a Vref of 129 kts. After flying several approaches and doing screen captures of the approach I came up with these two shots.

Here is the plane in landing configuration. I have less than the necessary thrust set to make the speed bleed off to near stall.
The speed in this picture is 108 KTS and a vertical speed of -420 FPM @ 100 feet above the runway, with 10 degrees nose up.
I continued to raise the nose to touchdown where I obtained a pitch angle of almost 15 degrees and in stall buffet the last 50 feet above the TDZE.

http://img577.imageshack.us/img577/4623/huf.png

Here is a snap of the plane just prior to touchdown.

http://img849.imageshack.us/img849/3537/7k2z.png

In this case, I was able to land on the runway in stall buffet and just scrape the aft part of the plane. If I had been just a little lower on this approach the gear and the aft of the plane would have hit short of the runway. It looks like, from the cell phone video and passenger reports, that the plane actually skimmed the water prior to hitting the rock wall.

Now, I have never flown the 777, but the other Boeing planes like the 747 and 767 all have pretty much the same auto-thrust system. The throttles are driven by a slip clutch when A/T is engaged. You can override the throttle movement while the A/T system is still engaged. This is something I would do many times to make small corrections to the speed. Since the plane was high and fast, I wonder if the pilot disengaged the A/T during the descent in order to get the plane down into the slot and then "forgot" to re-engage, or thought they were engaged. He could have just kept his hand on the throttles and held them at idle, but if he moved his hand off the throttles to maybe do something else the throttles would have increased if the speed was below what was dialed in on the glare shield speed window. In any event, I can only guess that the A/T were not on during the last portion of the flight and that resulted in a speed bleed as the nose was slowly raised during the last part of the approach.

BTW, during several of my simulated approaches, I kept the throttles back during the last portion of the approach in order to force the stall around 100 feet above the ground. Each time I got the speed down to around 106 KTS, buffet would occur. If I applied full thrust at that point almost every time the plane would make a successful go-around.

Lou

Uploaded with ImageShack.us

it was the pilot's first landing in the 777

Thank you for the analysis Lou. Was going to go through the same exercise myself this morning, before doing so I spent quite some time viewing Fred Hayes's video. Looks like they were dragging the tail through (or just over) the water for some 18 seconds or about 10 plane lengths, between 550 and 650 meters, prior to hitting the sea wall.

Going to have an interesting few hours replicating that. Crash detection OFF!

Weston wrote on Jul 9^th, 2013 at 12:19am:

it was the pilot's first landing in the 777

Actually, it was his first landing in San Francisco and I think at that time the ILS and PAPI were inop too.

To set the record straight, this is how training and qualifying go in the airlines today.

If you are already a qualified line captain, or even a new pilot to the operating certificate the training will generally follow this way.

First, you will go through several weeks of ground school and pass a written test.
Second, you will have an oral exam in all the systems and procedures pertaining to the aircraft and the operation.
Third, you will get a specified numbers in both a systems trainer called a CPT or cockpit procedures trainer.
Fourth, you will go through a number of hours in a six axis motion flight simulator that will include all parts of the normal, abnormal and emergency flight procedures that will end with a full check ride and a LOFT (line oriented flight training). If you pass all of this you receive your rating in the plane. The only thing left to do is get a specific number of hours of flying with a line flight instructor/check airman which on international types of flying would be at least two round trips and end with a line check ride.

These are the minimum things that need to be accomplished, if a pilot needed more time, it could be given.

It has no bearing as to whether this was his first landing in the real plane or if this was his first time in KSFO. Only very different airports such as high altitude or restricted terrain like PARO or La Paz would you get a check pilot to go along on your first time flying there. KSFO is a very ordinary large airport.

Even with the ILS G/S inop, the pilots could have built the approach in the computer and flown it with computer guidance.

I just have to wonder what the check pilot was doing through out the whole approach. Sure, you have to let the "student" make some mistakes to see if they will correct them, but once you get into the low regime that freedom will have to stop and the check pilot takeover. As a pilot for TWA and American, the rule was that the plane MUST be configured for landing before 1,000 feet on the approach. At 500 feet the non flying pilot (NFP) would call out speed & rate of sink. For example: The NFP would announce - 500' speed 137, sink 700. If the sink rate exceeded 1,000 FPM a go-around was required. The computer at 500 feet will call "sink rate" at around 1,500 FPM.

In this case the sink rate was not a problem, but the speed bleed was legion. To have the reference bug set at 137 KTS and see the airspeed needle at 106 KTS is beyond my understanding. What was the check pilot doing?

I think the Chairwomen of the NTSB, Deborah Hersman is very smart and in due time we will see just what happened.

At TWA our motto was "Fly Aggressively Safe."

LOLcakes wrote on Jul 9^th, 2013 at 1:28am:

Weston wrote on Jul 9^th, 2013 at 12:19am:

it was the pilot's first landing in the 777

Actually, it was his first landing in San Francisco and I think at that time the ILS and PAPI were inop too.

"The Runway 28L glideslope system had been inoperative due to a long-term construction project, but the instrument landing system localizer and a precision approach path indicator (PAPI), a visual-based glideslope, were operational at the time of the accident, Hersman says."

Ben

Hi guys.
I saw on another forum where a captain who had done the same as this pilot flew the 747 the moved to the 777. He said his initial thoughts are that if the pilot was conducting the descent in FLCH mode on the Autopilot it could be where he came unstuck. In the 747 FLCH mode is set up where if the speed gets close to the stall the throttles advance in TOGA mode. This stall protection was not applied to the 777. Easy for a converting pilot to make this mistake?? I think the outcome of the investigation will be interesting and a lot more than he got slow and low.

Cheers,
Nick. :-[

Saratoga wrote on Jul 9^th, 2013 at 3:19am:

LOLcakes wrote on Jul 9^th, 2013 at 1:28am:

Weston wrote on Jul 9^th, 2013 at 12:19am:

it was the pilot's first landing in the 777

Actually, it was his first landing in San Francisco and I think at that time the ILS and PAPI were inop too.

Hmm it seems I was mistaken... :-[

Email from a United 747 pilot that witnessed the 777 crash in SFO

They were holding short of runway 28L at the time of the crash.

On July 6, 2013 at approximately 1827Z I was the 747-400 relief F/O on flt 885, ID326/06 SFO-KIX. I was a witness to the Asiana Flt 214 accident. We had taxied to hold short of runway 28L at SFO on taxiway F, and were waiting to rectify a HAZMAT cargo issue as well as our final weights before we could run our before takeoff checklist and depart. As we waited on taxiway F heading East, just prior to the perpendicular holding area, all three pilots took notice of the Asiana 777 on short final. I noticed the aircraft looked low on glidepath and had a very high deck angle compared to what seemed �normal�. I then noticed at the apparent descent rate and closure to the runway environment the aircraft looked as though it was going to impact the approach lights mounted on piers in the SF Bay. The aircraft made a fairly drastic looking pull up in the last few feet and it appeared and sounded as if they had applied maximum thrust. However the descent path they were on continued and the thrust applied didn't appear to come soon enough to prevent impact. The tail cone and empennage of the 777 impacted the bulkhead seawall and departed the airplane and the main landing gear sheared off instantly. This created a long debris field along the arrival end of 28L, mostly along the right side of 28L. We saw the fuselage, largely intact, slide down the runway and out of view of our cockpit. We heard much confusion and quick instructions from SFO Tower and a few moments later heard an aircraft go around over the runway 28 complex. We realized within a few moments that we were apparently unharmed so I got on the PA and instructed everyone to remain seated and that we were safe.

We all acknowledged if we had been located between Runways 28R and 28L on taxiway F we would have likely suffered damage to the right side aft section of our aircraft from the 777.

Approximately two minutes later I was looking out the left side cockpit windows and noticed movement on the right side of Runway 28L. Two survivors were stumbling but moving abeam the Runway �28L� marking on the North side of the runway. I saw one survivor stand up, walk a few feet, then appear to squat down. The other appeared to be a woman and was walking, then fell off to her side and remained on the ground until rescue personnel arrived. The Captain was on the radio and I told him to tell tower what I had seen, but I ended up taking the microphone instead of relaying through him. I told SFO tower that there appeared to be survivors on the right side of the runway and they needed to send assistance immediately. It seemed to take a very long time for vehicles and assistance to arrive for these victims. The survivors I saw were approximately 1000-1500' away from the fuselage and had apparently been ejected from the fuselage.

We made numerous PAs to the passengers telling them any information we had, which we acknowledged was going to change rapidly, and I left the cockpit to check on the flight attendants and the overall mood of the passengers, as I was the third pilot and not in a control seat. A couple of our flight attendants were shaken up but ALL were doing an outstanding and extremely professional job of handling the passenger's needs and providing calm comfort to them. One of the flight attendants contacted unaccompanied minors' parents to ensure them their children were safe and would be taken care of by our crew. Their demeanor and professionalism during this horrific event was noteworthy. I went to each cabin and spoke to the passengers asking if everyone was OK and if they needed any assistance, and gave them information personally, to include telling them what I saw from the cockpit. I also provided encouragement that we would be OK, we'd tell them everything we learn and to please relax and be patient and expect this is going to be a long wait. The passenger mood was concerned but generally calm. A few individuals were emotional as nearly every passenger on the left side of the aircraft saw the fuselage and debris field going over 100 knots past our aircraft only 300' away. By this point everyone had looked out the windows and could see the smoke plume from the 777. A number of passengers also noticed what I had seen with the survivors out near the end of 28L expressing concern that the rescue effort appeared slow for those individuals that had been separated from the airplane wreckage.

We ultimately had a tug come out and tow us back to the gate, doing a 3 point turn in the hold short area of 28L. We were towed to gate 101 where the passengers deplaned. Captain Jim Abel met us at the aircraft and gave us information he had and asked if we needed any assistance or hotel rooms for the evening. Captain Herlihy and F/O Ishikawa went to hotels and I went to my home an hour away in the East Bay.

The 777-280ER Was caused by a stall

In the end, we will all have to draw our own conclusion as to the reason/cause of this tragedy. Somewhere in a room, NTSB, FAA, Owners, and lawyers are making decisions. It will be interesting to find out what they eventually provide us with what they will call the facts - just as they have done so many times before with A/C accident investigations.

Lou - I got that in a two part e-mail yesterday. The second part of the e-mail was this:

And now, the second piece, which I can't verify personally, where an unknown guy writes:

"After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the -400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it's a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don't think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all "got it" and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce "normal" standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt' compute that you needed to be a 1000' AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn't pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested "Radar Vectors" to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then "Cleared for the approach" and he could have selected "Exit Hold" and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to "Extend the FAF" and he couldn't understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was "Hold at XYZ." Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141's in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can't change 3000 years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It's actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don't trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don't get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I'll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250' after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800' after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real "flight time" or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it's the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck."

Bruce

Bruce,

I got that as well.

The pilots told the NTSB they were having trouble lining the plane for landing....??? Hun??? �:o :-?

Well, I guess if you never hand fly the plane you might have some trouble!

It's just sad. �:'(

My neighbor, who flew the 777 at AA said it was the easiest plane he ever flew. He called it a big Cub. �

Lou

Lou - A couple years ago we went to Maui non-stop from DEN and we had an older black Captain with grey hair. I remember seeing him in the gate area before boarding. He looked bored and like he wished he were somewhere else. As it was a UA 757 I listened to atc clear him on a visual approach to OGG. As you know they do a big wide U-turn to land(circle to land?). I saw the airport, as I had a starboard side window seat, and we were still quite high and the airport was quite a ways off when he said *runway in sight*! I about choked on my Mai Tai! That airplane made that turn and descended like it was on a rail. Not even one obvious correction. Amazing!! Talk about hand flying!

When we arrived back at Kahului for the overnight return 10 days later he was in the gate area again looking bored. I thought no wonder he's bored --- he can do this in his sleep!! I was glad he was the big Kahuna for that return flight though!

Bruce

Bruce,

I was very impressed and concerned with the statements of Captain Brown, in email above. I imagined that civilian Korean pilots would be highly skilled and reliable. :o

Pinatubo.

Pinatubo -

Agreed!!

My *Do Not Fly List* is growing!

Bruce

Bruce,
I am very disappointed to read your description of your time as IP . in ROK. Your experience with the Korean mindset matches what I experienced when I managed a technology operation in ROK in the early 90's. I had hoped that during the last 20 years the Koreans had improved their attitudes, but, maybe not. When I left ROK I said that, based on my experience there, I would never fly on KAL, and I never have. I'm sorry to say that I have no reason at this time to reconsider that personal embargo.

oliveone -

Very sorry if I mis-led you, or anyone else for that matter. That was not my personal experience, above, you are referring to. I simply copied and pasted that from an e-mail I had received from a friend (who is also a retired B52 driver btw). �I personally have no background whatsoever as a military, commercial or private pilot. I'm not even an accomplished sim pilot!! �;D

Bruce

First of all Bruce, you fly a very nice plane....I'v seen your videos!

A friend of mine sent me a .PPT of the crash scene of Asiana in KSFO.
I don't know how to up-load a .PPT, but I did a few screen captures... How anyone got out of this alive is amazing!

http://img835.imageshack.us/img835/2536/k2n.png

http://img38.imageshack.us/img38/9195/tosk.png

http://img40.imageshack.us/img40/4346/auf4.png

http://img27.imageshack.us/img27/4086/mzt.png

http://img96.imageshack.us/img96/9572/0j3y.png

Uploaded with ImageShack.us

Lou -

Thank you for the very nice compliment. I apply equal portions of b'gosh & b'golly, seat of the pants and Kentucky windage!!

Those pictures are hideous!! And to think someone from the flight deck instructed the pax to stay in their seats for 90 seconds!!! (I read that in one of the reports) �:o

Bruce

Hello passengers, Captain Sum Ting Wong here, we have arrived in San Francisco a few minutes ahead of schedule.
Please look around your seats for items you may have brought on board.

Thank you for flying AR211.

http://img585.imageshack.us/img585/7339/lzk0.jpg

Uploaded with ImageShack.us

btscott wrote on Jul 11^th, 2013 at 3:19pm:

Lou - I got that in a two part e-mail yesterday. The second part of the e-mail was this:

And now, the second piece, which I can't verify personally, where an unknown guy writes:

"After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the -400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it's a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don't think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 other and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all "got it" and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce "normal" standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt' compute that you needed to be a 1000' AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn't pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested "Radar Vectors" to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then "Cleared for the approach" and he could have selected "Exit Hold" and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to "Extend the FAF" and he couldn't understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was "Hold at XYZ." Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141's in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can't change 3000 years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It's actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don't trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don't get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I'll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250' after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800' after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real "flight time" or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it's the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck."

Bruce

I actually am not surprised about the pilots you talked about in your post. I was a driving instructor years ago, and I consistently had the most trouble with Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese people. They were university students who were taking driving lessons while in Canada, in order to purchase a vehicle to drive while in school. The problems you noticed were exactly the same for me, but of course flying an aircraft is significantly more hazardous if a mistake is made. They thought they could learn to drive by memorizing the instruction book, and having me give them specific step by step instruction on a particular maneuver, in which they would blindly follow without considering the variables that might force you to deviate from a particular set of instructions if the maneuver had to be modified due to other variables. They made the worst drivers, assuming they got the driving permit. Some asked how they were doing, and being very candid with them, I said they should save their money, and possibly save some lives, and buy a bike. I told them if they somehow stumble through a driving test, and get a driving permit, they should expect to be in an accident in a relatively short period of time.

LOU wrote on Jul 18^th, 2013 at 1:52am:

I think both captain Sum Ting Wong as his first officer Wi Too Lo, a senior captain too, will be fired soon after the conclusion of NTSB's aviation accident Investigation. �:(

Pinatubo wrote on Jul 18^th, 2013 at 6:28am:

LOU wrote on Jul 18^th, 2013 at 1:52am:

I think both captain Sum Ting Wong as his first officer Wi Too Lo, a senior captain too, will be fired soon after the conclusion of NTSB's aviation accident Investigation. �:(

Actually Sum Tin's half brother Wot Went was in the right seat. ;)

CAPTAIN SIM FORUM
General >> Hangar talks >> 777 Crash https://www.captainsim.org/forum/csf.pl?num=1373144936 Message started by Weston on Jul 6^th, 2013 at 9:08pm